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Pricing High Growth Firms: Arbitrage 
Opportunities in the Inc. 100
Benoit F. Leleux 
Veronique M. Matthys 
Julian E. Lange
The ability of the market to price high growth stocks is examined by analyzing the 
returns to simple investment portfolio strategies based on public information. The 
portfolios consist of shares in the firms listed in the Inc. 100 Ranking of the fastest 
growing public companies in America, The results indicate that significant abnormal 
returns are generated by these strategies, even after adjusting for risk. Although the 
tests could potentially be affected by a form of survivorship bias, supplementary 
analyses indicate that this is unlikely to be the case here. These results support the 
assumption that markets have difficulties pricing high-growth entities, leaving 
significant arbitrage opportunities in these stocks and validating the use of various 
market timing practices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Were capital markets efficient, no advantages could be gained by issuers 
attempting to time their stock offerings since their share price would always 
reflect all available information. Despite the general acceptance of the efficiency 
paradigm in its various strengths, investment bankers and issuers alike persist in 
spending great efforts and money in finding the right window of opportunity in 
the market, where temporary mispricing would optimize the proceeds of their 
planned financial operations. These two views are not necessarily antagonistic: 
market efficiency may very well be the rule under normal conditions, breaking 
down only in some extreme circumstances. The intended contribution of this 
paper is to investigate the pricing ability of the market in critical limit 
conditions, such as those prevaihng when attempting to price companies which 
have historically experienced extremely high growth rates. Support for the
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existence of pockets of inefficiency in such pricing environments would 
reconcile the general acceptance of market efficiency with timing practices.
Standard valuation theory assumes that the price of a share is simply the 
discounted value of all cash flows accruing to that stock in the future. Under an 
efficient market hypothesis, the resulting prices should at all times reflect 
rational expectations about the future, so that the realized remrns on such stock 
holdings should on average be commensurate with their risk level. However, 
empirical tests in the literature have highlighted many instances in which the 
pricing of stocks appears to deviate from that which would be expected under 
efficient markets. A first line of research indicated the existence of abnormal 
returns for small firms, which, in subsequent investigations, were further shown 
to occur primarily in early January (what became known as the January effect, 
although it should more adequately be referred to as the small firm January 
effect; Banz, 1981; Keim, 1983; Reinganum, 1983; Blume Sc Stambaugh, 1983; 
Ritter & Chopra, 1989). Other studies identified additional anomalies including 
a day-of-the-week effect: statistically significant differences in returns are 
observed on different days of the week, and in particular largely negative returns 
during the period from the close of the market on Friday to its close on Monday 
(French, 1980; Keim & Stambaugh, 1984); the earnings report effect: abnormal 
returns seem to occur around quarterly earnings announcements which differ 
markedly from prior analysts’ expectations (Rendleman, Jones, & Latane, 1982); 
and an overreaction/reversal effect: stocks having experienced high remrns 
during one period tend to underperform in subsequent periods, and vice-versa 
for the underperformers (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985; dayman, 1987; Chopra, 
Lakonishok, & Ritter, 1992; Haugen, 1995).
Supergrowth firms, which for the purpose of this study will be defined as 
the publicly traded firms having experienced the highest annual sales growth 
over the prior 5-year period, are especially likely to stretch the efficiency 
concept because: (1 ) future growth rates are difficult to estimate and very 
volatile; and (2 ) most of these firms belong to high beta cohorts where 
deviations from CAPM pricing have already been outlined in the empirical 
literature. Moreover, behavioral studies of decision-making under uncertainty 
indicate a tendency for estimates of future outcomes to be biased by 
observations of prior outcomes. Anchoring, for example, has been shown to 
occur where an initial best guess is adjusted upward or downward to predict a 
future outcome: the resulting estimated ranges tend to be too narrow and biased 
in the direction of the initial estimate. Issues of small sample size and the 
representativeness of prior observed experience can lead to further biases in 
estimates of future outcomes, as investigated by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 
(1982).
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The estimation of future growth rates for supergrowth firms can be 
hypothesized to be unduly affected by investors’ observations of recent growth 
rates, and therefore lead to expectations of stock prices which are biased upward 
from their intrinsic values. Indeed, a statistically significant over-reaction of this 
type has been observed by Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992). The over­
reaction effect was found to persist even after adjusting for firm size and risk 
and was shown to be more pronounced for smaller firms. The noted tendency for 
individuals to weight recent data more heavily in the making of judgments about 
the future might be expected to create further deviations from the conformance 
of observed returns to those predicted by the CAPM.
Even though stock prices at all times should reflect the present value of all 
future cash flows, it is clear that estimating the cash flows for supergrowth firms 
is a particularly difficult endeavor. Many of these firms belong to the smaller 
capitalization decile of the market, and as such may not be as closely followed 
by institutional investors as larger, more established companies. This lack of 
scrutiny may lead to a reduction in the quality of information available about the 
supergrowth stocks as a group and a lack of precision in the market’s pricing of 
these assets (Arbel, 1985). In addition, these stocks tend to exhibit high 
systematic risk, a factor which has been associated in previous papers with 
deviations from standard asset pricing models.
The objective of the study is, using simple investment portfolio strategies 
based on public information, to determine the extent to which abnormal returns 
could be earned by selectively investing in supergrowth stocks. The arbitrage 
trades are based on Inc. magazine’s annual ranking of the 100 fastest growing 
public companies in America. It is not claimed here that the Inc. 100 ranking is a 
comprehensive and exhaustive list of the fastest growing public firms in the 
United States but simply that it is likely to identify a group of companies 
particularly difficult to price for the market because of their extreme historical 
rates of growth and their high level of risk.
The results obtained tend to support the general hypothesis: opportunities for 
statistically significant abnormal returns seem to exist, even after correcting for 
risk and the possibility of a survivorship bias in the sample. An equally weighted 
investment in all firms listed in the Inc. 100 rankings for the period 1979 through 
1990 inclusive would have generated cumulative S«&P500 adjusted excess 
returns of approximately 23% in the 36 months following the ranking (with a t- 
test equal to 3.166 which enables us to reject the hypothesis that abnormal 
returns are equal to zero with a degree of confidence greater than 1%). The 
results are generally not consistent with market efficiency for these supergrowth 
firms, leaving open the possibility of strategic games, such as issue timing, by 
issuers and investors alike.
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These results shed new light on the apparent contradiction between the 
commonly accepted efficiency paradigm and the observed widespread reliance of 
issuers and investment bankers alike on market timing practices. If the market is 
indeed less efficient in the limit conditions that these supergrowth firms embody, 
then mispricings may occur and timing may be a value-generating exercise.
The study is structured as follows. Section II lays down the research 
hypotheses and their conceptual justifications. Section III outlines the database 
created for the purpose of this research program. It is followed by an extensive 
presentation of the methodologies used to measure abnormal returns in the 
supergrowth portfolios. Section V provides some descriptive statistics of the 
sample, and introduces the extensive analyses of the results conducted in Section
VI. Conclusions and discussions ensue.
II. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The fundamental objective of the paper is to investigate the market’s ability to 
properly price a group of firms characterized by very high historical sales 
growth rates. As outhned in the introduction, these firms are likely to stretch the 
market efficiency concept to the limit because of the intrinsic volatility of such 
firms and the difficulty of forecasting future growth and risk. Testing for pricing 
errors in supergrowth firms thus becomes a proxy for the larger question of 
market efficiency in critical (limit) conditions. As such, it will also suffer from 
the traditional joint hypothesis problem, in the sense that it is not possible to 
effectively disaggregate the effect of market inefficiency from the 
misspecification of the return-generating process. All statements about market 
efficiency should be interpreted in light of that constraint.
Within that broad statement of objectives, a set of more specific hypotheses 
are analyzed.
Hypothesis 1: Supergrowth firms have higher-than-normal exposure to 
market risk, i.e. they exhibit statistically higher levels of systematic 
risk than the market as a whole.
Hypothesis 1 serves important conceptual and methodological purposes. 
Conceptually, the evolution of market risk exposure for high growth firms is still 
largely uncharted territory, as outlined by Cotter (1992) and Loughran and Ritter
(1994). The common understanding is that firms going public through an IPO, 
being relatively young and having products with untested futures, have high risk, 
as mentioned by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). A significant problem 
with this approach, highlighted in Cotter (1992) and Leleux (1993), is that total 
risk is often mistaken for market-related risk (systematic or beta risk). In other
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words, these firms seem to exhibit large variances in their returns but the 
sensitivity of these returns to variations in market returns may not necessarily be 
high. Most of the risk inherent in these young, high-growth firms may be of a 
non-systematic, firm-specific nature and thus easily diversifiable in a portfolio. 
These risks may include prototyping and production problems, marketing and 
logistics constraints, etc., most of which are unconnected to the performance of 
financial markets as a whole. No return premia should then be expected to carry 
unsystematic risk, as underhned in the finance literature.
The nature of the risk has important methodological implications for the 
choice of the returns’ adjustment procedure. If the systematic risk measure is 
close to 1.0 on average, a simple adjustment to the market would be acceptable. 
On the other hand, if beta is statistically different from 1.0, an additional risk 
adjustment is required, using some form of risk/return model, usually the 
CAPM. Hypothesis 1 is set up to investigate such point and provide guidance for 
the risk-adjustment mechanism required.
Hypothesis 2: Abnormal returns can be observed for supergrowth firms 
before, upon, or after the Inc. 100 rankings publishing dates.
Hypothesis 2 tests the market efficiency concept. In a semi-strong form 
efficient market, stock prices correctly reflect all publicly available information, 
so that changes in stock prices around information announcements (such as the 
publication of the Inc. 100 rankings) provide an unbiased assessment of the 
economic effect of the event on the target/acquiror company’s shareholders 
(Schwert, 1984; Brown & Warner, 1980, 1985). Furthermore, companies only 
earn normal rates of return over the long-term, where normal is defined with 
respect to their respective risk cohort.
Hypothesis 3: Cumulative abnormal returns post-ranking can be related 
to growth-related variables, both historical and forward-looking.
Hypothesis 3 examines various explanatory variables for the performance of 
the supergrowth firms’ arbitrage strategies. It attempts to identify factors driving 
abnormal returns over the long run in these strategies, factors which the 
literature indicates could include prior growth rates, growth in net income, 
market-to-book ratio, price/earning multiple, etc.
HI. DATABASE
The Inc. 100 ranking of the fastest growing public companies in America, 
where growth is measured by the average sales growth figure over the previous
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5-year period, was first published by Inc. ma:gazine in May 1979 and has been a 
regular feature ever since, with the exception of 1991.^  All rankings from 1979 
until 1990, or 12 complete rankings of the 100 best performing firms, are used 
here. The post-1990 rankings are ignored because of insufficient post-event time 
to test for long-term performance.
A number of firms suffered from early delisting, for reasons such as 
mergers, acquisitions, going-private transactions, bankruptcies, or hquidations. 
Delisting reasons were investigated to obtain as accurate a picture as possible of 
the total performance of the arbitrage strategies from setup to delisting. For 
about 10% of the firms delisted within 36 months of the ranking, it was not 
possible to trace back the delisting reasons, leaving a bias of unknown direction 
and magnitude in the sample.
For each firm in the sample, the following information was collected; rank 
in Inc. 100 survey, name of the company, industry code, sales growth in the five 
years prior to the ranking, revenues and net income in last financial report and 
prior five years, number of employees in ranking year and prior five years, year 
the company went public and on which market, salary of CEO, whether the 
CEO founded the company, and his/her equity ownership. Monthly remrn and 
systematic risk data was obtained from Compustat sources and the monthly 
CRSP tapes from the University of Chicago. Economic series, such as monthly 
risk-free rates and returns on market indices (Standard & Poors 500 and Dow 
Jones Industrial) were downloaded from Citibase.
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Traditional event study performance analysis is based on the measurement of 
some abnormal return for the shares investigated over a period of interest. In the 
case at hand, the objective is to determine to what extent a ranking in the 
Inc. 100 list of the fastest growing public companies in America actually conveys 
information about future returns, i.e. is it possible to implement, on the basis of 
the rankings, investment strategies that will earn returns higher than expected 
under standard risk/return models? This objective imphes that the period of 
interest for the analysis is the post-ranking months, since trading (or arbitrage) 
strategies must be based on information released in the Inc. 100 rankings. These 
rankings have historically been published in May each year. The month of 
publication of the ranking is then referred as Month 0 in the event smdy. All 
subsequent months are denoted by higher integers, i.e. the third month post­
ranking is month 3.
The definition of what constitutes abnormal returns presupposes 1) the 
knowledge of the return generating process and, 2) market efficiency, in the 
sense that risk information is indeed reflected in the prices. Accordingly, event
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studies are always joint tests of both market efficiency and the particular model 
being used to represent the return process. Two models are used here for the 
latter. First, a simple market model is assumed, implicitly positing that the 
expected return for all stock is the actual return realized on the market for the 
period. Abnormal returns are then measured by:
^^i,t ~ ^i,t ~ ^m,t
where AR^ is the market-adjusted abnormal return on share i in post-event 
month t, Rf j  is the raw return on share i in month t, and R^ f is the corresponding 
return on the market index. The choice of an adequate market benchmark 
potentially influences the reported results, so two indices are used here: the 
Standard & Poors 500 and the Dow Jones 30 Industrial. Additional indices were 
used in the analysis, such as the CRSP indices, but did not materially affect the 
results. The second model explicitly incorporates the systematic risk of 
individual securities in the adjustment procedure, using a CAPM-type risk/return 
relationship. Abnormal returns are measured as follows:
ARi t = Ri t -  [Rf^ t + PiiMRP)] (2)
where Ri f is the raw return on share / in month t, and R^  f is the corresponding 
return on the risk-free security (proxied here by the return on the U.S. Treasury 
90-day bill), jSj is share i ’s systematic risk coefficient measured over the previous 
60 months,^ and MRP is the ex-post Market Risk Premium.
For each method, an average abnormal return is then calculated for each 
event month following the Inc. 100 ranking, using:
1
= -  Z  AR, , (3)
<i=l
where n, is the number of shares in the cross-section in post-ranking month t. 
The long-run performance measure involves the cumulating of these abnormal 
remms over time for each individual firm, followed by cross-sectional averages 
(Dimson & Marsh, 1986):
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1 "
CAR^ r  = -  I  s,i n
t =  1
T
- 1 (4)
Although this has been the method of choice for many years, Conrad and Kaul 
(1993) highlighted the potential bias in this procedure, which aggregates not 
only returns but also individual estimation errors. In general, estimation errors
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seem to cancel out, but the potential remains and the magnitude of the problem 
is unknown. To mitigate the problem, buy-and-hold abnormal returns are also 
calculated.
V. SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
As mentioned above, 1,200 firms entered the 1979-1990 Inc. 100 rankings. Of 
these firms, about 3% could not be located using a combination of Bridge on­
line, Compustat, Standard and Poors Stock Listings, Datastream, and Dial-Data 
Stock Lookup, possibly resulting from typos in the original Inc. 100 listings.
The distribution of the sample’s sales growth in the five years leading to the 
ranking are depicted in exhibit 1. Most firms experience average compounded 
annual growth rates over that 5 year span in excess of 100% (mean=122.85%; 
median=106%), with the top ranked firms exceeding 500% (maximum=678%). 
These figures qualify the sample firms as supergrowth firms, justifying the title 
of the paper. The cumulative distribution of reported net incomes in the ranking 
years further qualifies these sample firms as growth companies with relatively 
small current incomes. Indeed, over 80% of the sample firms report net incomes 
below $5 miUion in the ranking years (Exhibit 1).
250
Exhibit 1
Distribution of Average Compounded Annual Growth Rates (in %) in Sales over 
the 5 Year Period Leading to the Ranking
Growth firms have also gained recognition as the true engines of 
employment. The distribution of employment among sample firms is instructive 
in this regard. The sample mean is at 671 employees (Median=216), with a 
standard deviation of 117 and a non-normal distribution. The sample firms had, 
on average, only 84 employees (with a standard deviation of 289 and a median 
of 30) 5 years before the rankings, indicating a compound annual growth rate in 
employment of 51.52% per year based on the mean figures and 48.41% based 
on the median employment figures.
The corporate control and governance literature highlights the strong 
convergence of ownership and control in younger, entrepreneurial institutions as 
a possible explanation for the superior performance observed. An examination of 
the distribution of CEO salaries for the firms sampled after 1988  ^ shows the 
mean salary at $229,164 (median=$150,000) with a standard deviation of 
$391,501. Equally relevant to the control issue is the distribution of CEO 
ownership in their own companies. For the sample the mean ownership position 
is at 16.1% (median=10.0%), with a standard deviation of 15%, a minimum of 
0% and a maximum of 75%.
The results presented so far are static by design, assuming that the variables 
described did not significantly change over the period of investigation. In order 
to analyze changes through time, similar descriptive statistics have been 
compiled by ranking year. The average sales growth for each cohort year 
(ranking year) is a statistic that can be interpreted as the average sales growth a 
firm must have achieved in order to qualify for the Inc. 100 ranking. Since all 
rankings are relative by design, economy-wide factors may determine which 
firms actually show up in any one particular table. An examination of the data 
indicates that firms in the 1979 ranking averaged 68% average sales growth per 
year in the 5 years prior to the ranking year (Median=46%). The firms in the 
1990 cohort, for their part, averaged 146% per year (Median=124%) over the 
same prior 5 years. The ?-test for the difference of the means in the two cohort 
years equals 7.88, significant at the 1% level. This indicates that making the 
ranking has become a much more competitive sport as well.
It is interesting to note the relative lack of evolution in the average number 
of employees in the Inc.lOO-listed firms. From an average of 519 employees in 
1979 (Median=235), the figure does not change statistically (Mest=1.06) 
throughout the 12-year analysis period, ending with 665 employees on average 
(Median=285) in the 1990 rankings.
The empirical finance literature highlights the explanatory power of both the 
market to book ratio and the Price-Eamings Multiple. Both measures are 
forward-looking in perspective, interpreted as reflections of the growth 
opportunities of the company. These two measures thus offer a valuable piece of
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information to add to the historical-based growth rates and may help understand 
the future performance of the supergrowth firms.
Exhibit 2 indicates that indeed market-to-book ratios significantly evolve 
through the post-ranking periods, falling from around 135 in the ranking month 
to an average of 74 some 36 months following the ranking. These figures can be 
interpreted in different ways. First, this evolution could be the natural 
consequence of the growth opportunities being converted over time into assets in 
place and greater book values. Second, the fall in the ratio could also be 
interpreted as a consequence of the non-repeatability of the exceptionally high 
historical growth rates experienced by these firms. Finally, the fall could imply 
that the capital markets are efficiently arbitraging away market imperfections 
following the release of relevant information, in this case the Inc. 100 rankings 
themselves. Although it would be pure speculation at this point to support one 
explanation over the other, it is interesting to note that the average market-to- 
book ratio remains exceptionally high for the sample firms compared to the 
ratios prevailing in the stockmarket-listed firms at large. The price-eamings 
multiples tell a very similar story, although very little trend can be detected in 
the results there. The observed average price-eamings multiples in the 30-40 
range are quite unusual and again indicate the exceptional growth potential of 
these sample supergrowth firms.
140
130
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Post-Ranking Ev«nt Month
Exhibit 2 
Evolution of Market-to-Book Ratios
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VI. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Systematic Risk of Sample Firms
In order to select the proper risk-adjustment procedure when calculating 
abnormal returns, it is necessary to test for the level of systematic risk (beta) in 
the sample firms. Beta is a measurement of the sensitivity of a company’s stock 
price to the overall fluctuations in the stock market, proxied here by the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 Index Price for Industrial Companies. Beta is calculated 
here for a 5-year (60-month) time period, ending in the ranking month. If less 
price history is available, beta is calculated for as few as 24 months. Total 
monthly returns, including dividends received, are used in the calculation. The 
resulting average betas for each event month around the ranking date are 
presented in Exhibit 3. Betas are shown to range from 1.25 to 1.43, significantly 
greater than the market average of 1.00 at the 1% level of significance. These 
figures support hypothesis 1 and, by direct implication, the use of risk-adjusted 
returns in complement to the simpler market adjustment, which would be 
upward-biased in this case.
B nnt Month from lnc.100 Ranking
Exhibit 3
Event-Time Evolution of Sample Firms’ Systematic Risk Coefficient (Beta)
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Monthly Abnormal Returns
The next step in the analysis consists in estimating the monthly abnormal 
returns in the post-ranking period. To facilitate the analysis, cumulative 
abnormal returns are reported in Exhibit 4 for a 36-month post-ranking period. 
Two features stand out in the long-term performance of the shares.
First of all, the Inc. 100 rankings are followed by a significant dip, or a 
period of abnormally negative returns. This temporary underperformance is 
particularly evident when using the risk-adjusted returns and appears to last for 
about 10 to 12 months following the rankings. This evidence would tend to 
support the notion that shares appearing in the Inc. 100 rankings may be 
overbought by investors chasing the next hot company, resulting in prices that 
are not sustainable over time. The inevitable market correction results in the 
negative abnormal returns observed through month 10.
Second, following these negative returns, firms tend to experience 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns. This evidence would tend to 
support an alternative interpretation: that the market is actually underestimating 
the future growth potential of the firms listed in the rankings or overestimating 
their risk and, accordingly, systematically underpricing them. Strategies based
P osM no 100 Ranking E vent Month
-Cum. RawRetums Cunrv S8P500Adjusted RatumT Cum. Risk Adjusted RetumTl
Exhibit 4
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Inc. 100 Ranked Firms
on purchasing stocks listed in the Inc. 100 rankings in the month of the ranking 
and holding them over 36 months thus generate raw returns of approximately 
68% over the period, or some 40% in excess of what would have been expected 
given the level of risk assumed in the strategy. The ?-tests for the most 
conservative of the adjustments, the market-model based correction, indicate that 
the abnormal returns for the first 36 post-ranking months are significant at the 
1% level of confidence.
Keeping in mind the limitations due to the fact that this approach jointly 
tests the return-generating process and market efficiency itself, these positive 
cumulative abnormal returns would still tend to support the apparent inability of 
the market to properly price supergrowth stocks, leaving opportunities for 
arbitrage profits, either short-selling the hst over a short horizon (about 6 
months) or buying the stocks and holding them over the long term (up to 36 
months).
A critical factor to consider in implementing such simple arbitrage strategies 
is whether or not the pattern of long-term underpricing is robust with respect to 
the year of the ranking. To formally test for such factor, long-term cumulative 
abnormal returns were first analyzed on a year-by-year basis for the same 
sample of Inc.lOO-ranked firms. The results of the analyses using unadjusted 
raw returns indicate that even though the pattern seems present in almost all 
ranking years, the 1985, 1986 and 1987 cohorts would not have been such great 
investments over the 36-month horizon considered here. These three cohort 
years actually include the effect of the broader 1987 stock market crash in their 
long-term performance.
As mentioned earlier, raw returns are not a proper measure to account for 
the systematic risk of these supergrowth firms. Exhibit 5 presents the same 
information but on a market-adjusted basis. Once again, the cohort years 1984, 
1985, 1986 and 1987 seem to have been affected by the 1987 stock market 
crash.
Regression Analyses
The empirical analyses performed above pertain to determining to what 
extent simple strategies based on public information, in this case the Inc. 100 
ranking of the fastest growing public companies in America, could be used to 
generate remrns in excess of what a normal risk/return relationship would 
require. Such deviations are interpreted as supporting the inability of the market 
to properly price stocks characterized by high systematic risks (beta) and 
extremely large historical growth rates.
A final step involves the investigation of the factors that may explain the 
abnormal returns observed in a classic regression methodology. Possible
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Post-Ranking Euent Month
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Figure 5.
Cumulative Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns by Ranking Year
explanatory factors for the cumulative abnormal returns over the 36 months 
post-ranking period include the growth in sales over the previous 5 years 
(GSALES5), the growth in net income (GNI5), the growth in the number of 
employees (GEMPLOY5), the market-to-book ratio at the time of the ranking 
(MKBKRO), the price-earning ratio at the time of the ranking (PEMO), the 
owner’s salary (SALARY) or equity ownership (EQUITY) in the fibntn, and 
whether the current CEO is also the company founder (CEOFD).
To investigate the possible existence of a multicolinearity problem, the 
Pearson correlation coefficients between factors are presented in Exhibit 6 with 
the degrees of confidence for rejection of Hq : the coefficient of correlation is 
equal to zero. As anticipated, a number of the variables appear to be correlated 
significantly, such as GSALES5, GNI5, and GEMPLOY5. On the other hand, 
SALARY and EQUITY appear to be less correlated. Both market-to-book and 
price-to-eaming ratios have little correlation with the other factors and have not 
been included in the table.
With this multicolinearity problem, it is difficult to evaluate the real 
explanatory power of each of the correlated variables on the long-term
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Exhibit 6
Person Correlation Coefficient and Significance Levels
GSALES5 GNI5 GEMPL0Y5 SALARY EQUITY
GSALES5 1.000 0.365 0.434 0.032 -0.081
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.657 0.103
GNI5 1.000 0.363 0.203 0.100
0.000 0.000 0.054 0.147






performance of the supergrowth firms in the sample. None of the regressions 
performed, with either single explanatory factors or combinations thereof, 
indicate significant relationships. In other words, none of the growth-related 
historical factors, such as past growth in earnings, sales, net income, 
employment, or time of ranking appear to significantly determine the stock price 
performance following the Inc. 100 rankings. The two forward-looking variables 
(market-to-book and price-to-eaming ratios at the time of ranking) usually 
appear in the regressions with negative coefficients, indicating that the firms 
with the largest ratios actually did worse on the long-term performance variable, 
but none of these coefficients are statistically different from zero. Hypothesis 3 
does not seem to be supported.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The initial objective of the study was to determine the extent to which the 
market is able to properly price stocks characterized by very high historical 
growth rates. A number of arguments can be made to support possible market 
inefficiencies under these limit conditions. The finance literature focuses on the 
importance of growth rates and systematic risk in pricing shares, both factors 
which are likely to be difficult to evaluate for firms having experienced 
explosive growth in the previous five years. The psychology literature, and in 
particular, its subset studying human inferences and its biases, highlights the 
tendency for individuals to diverge from pure rationality, for example by 
attributing larger probabilities than deserved to events relatively close in time to 
the present. In other words, humans may not be perfect Bayesian updaters, 
letting a number of biases taint their inferential processes.
In order to test market efficiency in these conditions, the returns to simple 
investment portfolio strategies based on public information are investigated.
The portfolios consist of shares in the firms listed in the Inc. 100 Ranking of the 
fastest growing public companies in America. These portfolios are assembled 
when the rankings are published and held for various lengths of time. The 
analyses conducted here indicate that significant abnormal returns are generated 
for these strategies in excess of what would normally be required to compensate 
for the level of risk incurred. Although the tests could potentially be affected by 
a form of survivorship bias, supplementary cohort analyses indicate that this is 
unlikely to be the case. Cross-sectional regressions were not able to single out 
significant explanatory factors for the long-term performance of these 
investment strategies.
The results of this study are relevant for both investors and issuers. If indeed 
the market is not able to properly price high-growth entities, a fact long 
theorized by growth and new venture specialists, then significant abnormal 
returns could be earned following simple trading rules. From a company 
standpoint, such inefficiencies indicate the possibility of windows of opportunity 
in the market for issuing new shares, a view again long-supported by investment 
bankers and issuers alike. In other words, periods of overpricing and 
underpricing of shares may exist, justifying the recourse to, respectively, new 
issuances or stock repurchases.
The existence of pockets of inefficiency in the market in its high-growth 
segments puts a serious cap on the generally accepted concept of efficiency as a 
whole. If indeed the market is efficient under reasonable conditions, deviations 
from that norm (such as those resulting from explosive growth, bankruptcies, 
liquidations, major catastrophes, etc.) seem to quickly stretch the abihty of the 
market to analyze and incorporate the new information into the prices. These 
delayed responses or mispricings open up the door to strategic behavior by 
issuers and investors alike, something most financial actors have long supported 
but could not be accommodated by the classical market efficiency paradigm.
It is important also to recognize a number of problems with the analyses 
performed here. First of all, the existence of abnormal portfolio returns could be 
due either to market inefficiency or the misspecification of the return generating 
process. The latter is even more likely given the high level of systematic risk of 
the securities involved. Second, the regression results are tainted by the lack of 
availability of information on some of the explanatory variables. The resulting 
selection bias could not be quantified.
NOTES
1. The lapse was acknowledged by Inc. magazine’s research manager for both the Inc.500 and
the Inc. 100 annual surveys.
2. Or a minimum of 24 months if data are not available for the whole 60 months.
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3. Ownership information for the years prior to 1988 is not available.
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